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In his recent book, Creative Actualization: A Meliorist Theory of Values, Hugh Mc-
Donald wades into the murky waters of value theory in order to develop a uniquely 
pragmatist theory of value. He ties value to what he calls “creative actualizations,” 
or the process of introducing novelties, conditions, norms and principles into our 
individual and collective experience. Creative actualization accommodates a plu-
rality of independent values, resisting the temptation to embrace a monist frame-
work, whether by making our diverse values instrumental to a final end or relative 
to a single (objective or subjective) source. Moreover, as McDonald argues, creative 
actualization has the theoretical resources to underpin a meliorist approach to 
pragmatist ethics. For McDonald, a pragmatist axiology must entertain commit-
ments beyond those found in traditional theories, exploring the frontiers of value 
theory in, for instance, new areas of applied ethics (particularly environmental 
ethics). This exploratory element is one of the philosophical strengths of creative 
actualization compared to other more mainstream axiological theories. Readers 
looking for a Deweyan account of value theory should be pleased with the direc-
tion of McDonald’s project.
McDonald proceeds in three stages. First, he argues for a connection between 
creative actualization and values. Though not all values are creatively actualized, 
all are integrally related to the process of creative actualization. Second, in his ac-
count of ethics, creative actualization functions as a key source of value and morals. 
Finally, he criticizes traditional value theories, especially those that situate value in 
an objective realm, in the valuer or her subjective evaluations, or in some relation 
between a subject and object. The upshot of creative actualization is that it pro-
vides an alternative to value theories that rely on a sole source of value to serve as 
the ground of other goods or values. On McDonald’s account, traditional theories 
of value are hierarchical, or grounded on some singular value. There is a summom 
bonum, and all other values have worth in virtue of their relationship to that ulti-
mate value. Creative actualization eschews this hierarchical structure in favor of a 
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plurality of goods and values. Instead of the traditional account, we might imagine 
a plurality of independent goods and values, the shared basis of which is their status 
as either outcomes of, or raw materials for, creative actualization.
In the first two chapters, McDonald outlines creative actualization as a theory 
of value. He specifies the exact relation between creative actualizations and inher-
ent value. A creative actualization is the bringing about of a novelty. It is an activity 
directed at producing some novelty in the world, be it a piece of art, an invention, or 
a norm. In some instances, this bringing about involves evaluating some imagined 
good as worthwhile. If it is a success, this end of the activity constitutes a creative 
actualization. McDonald’s opening example of the origins of an airplane is help-
ful here. While psychological factors such as the designer’s wants and desires play 
a role in the process that leads to the existence of flying machines, these factors do 
not make a flying machine a good one (10). The working plane is the creative actu-
alization. This creative actualization marks new possibilities; it changes the world 
and the way we are in it in some way. 
On this view, the subtle (or maybe not so subtle) changes in the world reveal 
“practical possibilities” and newly emerging values (13). The process of bringing 
about a creative actualization resembles the process of inventing or improving a 
design, which involves an appreciation for the potential value of the actualization. 
At this point, two features of the theory come into focus. First, the relationship 
described between potentiality and actuality echoes Aristotle’s arguments for the 
priority of actuality in Metaphysics (Trans. W.D. Ross, Book IX.8). Creative actual-
izations, actuality, disclose and limit possibility, and thereby have priority regarding 
value. However, the process of creative actualization can involve the consideration 
of other possibilities than those actualized, which are themselves grounded by cre-
ative actualizations. Thus the process of creative actualization involves the interplay 
of actualizations and the possibilities, though actualizations have priority. Second, 
even at this early stage in McDonald’s account, one can feel the undercurrent of a 
meliorist approach to ethics. Value is tied to the activity of improvement, gener-
ally, which itself involves “worth, action, end and achieved good” (12). Together, 
the Aristotelian and meliorist characters of creative actualization makes one won-
der about the extent to which other Aristotelian elements might be friendly to a 
pragmatist axiology.
Values as creative actualizations and the transformations we see in the world are 
interrelated. This emergent feature of the theory is important. One might wonder, 
“the invention of the flying machine opens up new possibilities, but it might well 
close just as many, so why should we think that a post-flying-machine world is an 
improvement?” The evaluation of some end or imagined design as worthwhile or 
potentially fruitful relies upon already actualized objects and norms. This account 
of the relation between potentiality and actuality anticipates the objection that the 
theory does not account for improvements, but different, equally valuable sets of 
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situations. Imagine world A with all and only goods 1 through 5. Who is to say that 
a creative actualization grounded on A does not yield world B with all and only 
goods 6 through 10, and that the value of A and B are not equal? While McDonald 
argues in chapter three that we have an obligation to improve the world, and that 
the value of improvement must be tied to creative actualization, I think his story 
is suggestive of a stronger defense against this objection. World B relies on the ac-
tivities of actualization available in world A, and that actualization opened up new 
possibilities valued on standards available in A. Because the world plays a critical 
role in conditioning values, but is itself formed by past creative actualizations, Mc-
Donald’s theory offers a picture of how improvement occurs. In this way, McDon-
ald’s work explores how meliorism invites a new way of thinking about value theory.
In chapters three and four, McDonald articulates the relationship between 
creative actualization and moral justification, offers an account of why the world 
has value, and through this lays the foundation for establishing obligations toward 
features of the environment. In this account, there is a wealth of material, including 
an overview of the principles of an ethics of creative actualization. McDonald is to 
be commended for exploring this vital relationship between ethics and axiology. I 
would encourage the reader to consider the principles of reciprocity, compossibil-
ity, pluralism and meliorism as McDonald defends them. However, my focus here 
is not on these principles, but on the relative weighting and prioritization of values. 
There are many different kinds of value (for instance, aesthetic, economic, and epis-
temic), and there is the question of how to adjudicate between them when they come 
into conflict. This question seems intuitively harder to answer if one does not have 
recourse to a summom bonum. In the book’s preface, McDonald claims, “Morals 
do not provide a ground for value but a reciprocal limit. . . . Morals are regulative 
over creative actualization as a limit to value, while agents in turn creatively actual-
ize moral values” (3). In other words, moral value is both a regulative ideal and an 
outcome of the process of creative actualization. In chapter three, the reader gets 
a fuller explanation of this conception of morals, and in chapter four, a defense of 
the value of life and the world.
McDonald re-casts the question of how morals are fundamental but not a 
ground of value in the question “Why be moral?” (123). He argues that morals are 
practically necessary in daily life. Particular norms and duties are the products of 
creative actualization in the face of this necessity. This necessity does the grounding 
work in answering the “why” question without positing normative foundations. But 
it leaves open the possibility that other goods “aim at” morality, which would seem 
to support a hierarchical conception of values. Instead, morals are the condition 
for other values insofar as other values are reciprocally related to morals, and are 
compossible with other values. Reciprocity follows from morality’s practical neces-
sity, since other values stand and fall with morals, and vice versa. Still, we might 
wonder if this answers the “why” question. This answer emerges in McDonald’s 
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treatment of the problem of free-riders, whereby some seek to benefit from other 
moral agents’ conformity to norms without bearing the costs associated with re-
ciprocal compliance. Insofar as the world in which these riders reside is one where 
moral norms and principles are creatively actualized, these individuals are equally 
subject to moral evaluation. Given the condition of reciprocity, an ethic based on 
creative actualization requires compossibility of value (one value cannot preclude 
another, since they always stand in reciprocal relation to each other). This feature 
affords some direction as to how to adjudicate conflicts between value-kinds. In 
such cases, we can seek to promote values compatible with a wider array of other 
values, including instances of other value-types. The free-rider ethos, choosing 
some value over moral value, actually limits the extent to which different kinds of 
value can be realized. McDonald’s proposal for an ethic of creative actualization 
gives rise to a plurality of values, since one value would not be capable of crowding 
others out of existence.
Those with specific interests in environmental ethics will find chapter four 
valuable, particularly the discussion of the value of the world and the relationship 
between cultural and environmental values. Similar to other non-anthropocentrists 
in environmental ethics (for instance, Arne Naess, Holmes Rolston, III, and J. Baird 
Calicott), McDonald defends the intrinsic value of organisms, arguing, “life cre-
atively actualizes itself” (169). Flora, fauna, species and other living things creatively 
actualize their own lives under a variety of environmental conditions. Since life is a 
process of creative actualization, living organisms have value independent of their 
usefulness to human beings. McDonald has an interesting view of the value of spe-
cies as opposed to individuals. In species that are not endangered or threatened, 
individual members may lack value compared to others belonging to endangered 
species. Why are some living beings more valuable than others? The more valued 
individuals are essential to the continuation of their species. 
But what parts of the environment have value? Do rocks, water, mountains, riv-
ers and the entire ecosystems of which they are a part possess intrinsic value? These 
are not creative actualizations. Those things (air of the right sort, water, and the other 
elements on which life depends) are valuable insofar as they are practically necessary 
for self-actualization. While water is not creatively actualized, there is room in the 
theory to account for its value. It is practically necessary for the creative actualiza-
tions of other living things. A possible objection to McDonald’s account is that one 
can imagine that there could be biological systems without what we humans and 
other actually existing species would consider “good air.” Suppose the existence of 
air suitable for thriving human, animal, and plant life precludes some set of practical 
possibilities. Does this feature speak against the intrinsic value of air necessary for 
human life? As is the case with most non-anthropocentric theories in environmental 
ethics, McDonald’s affords little appreciation for the anthropocentrism at the core 
of our common-sense intuitions about why the natural environment is valuable. 
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In the final three chapters, McDonald employs creative actualization as a point 
of departure for critically examining other types of value theory. The reader will 
discover in this section a historically grounded critique of these theories. McDon-
ald levels a number of arguments at these historically important theories, some of 
which are independent of his theory of creative actualization. The contrast between 
creative actualization and other, more traditional axiological theories complements 
McDonald’s earlier articulation, and brings the pragmatist elements of his theory 
(emphasizing activity, process, pluralism and meliorism) into stark relief. How-
ever, readers looking for a thorough history of pragmatist value theory will not 
find what they are seeking in McDonald’s work. This is not to say that McDonald’s 
work wholly neglects the traditional movements in value theory and the major au-
thors of the pragmatist tradition. His criticisms of diverse types of value theories 
demonstrate otherwise. However, the emphasis of the work is on articulating a new 
position, not defending an old one. Proving that creative actualization is a Deweyan 
or pragmatist view is not one of McDonald’s central tasks. Still, he notes “Creative 
actualization is consistent with the value theory of historical pragmatism, especially 
John Dewey’s. . . . Dewey has an essentially active theory of value in acts of prizing, 
caring for, and artistic creation” (12). The project of developing a robust argument 
for labeling the theory “Deweyan” is left to the reader. 
Perhaps the greatest virtue of the book, insofar as teaching is concerned, is the 
work’s breadth, providing points of entry into a variety of debates and questions 
in theoretical and practical philosophy. Educators introducing value theories and 
criticisms of them into their courses should find the lucid treatments compelling. 
Moreover, the discussion of hierarchical value theories provides a useful image for 
students trying to grasp how different modes of value relate. More advanced stu-
dents puzzled about the relationship between different arenas of value (epistemic 
and ethical, for example) will find the book a helpful resource in their studies. On 
the side of practical philosophy, McDonald’s work is an invitation for pragmatists 
and other philosophers to contemplate important axiological questions in the area 
of environmental ethics. The conditions of reciprocity and compossibility provide 
a framework for understanding the moral impact of our various interactions with 
the environment. While the central arguments of the book do not (for the most 
part) explicitly connect with Dewey studies, readers will nevertheless find a model 
for Deweyan engagement with contemporary issues in value theory. 
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